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A Voice that is Merely Breath 
 
Michael Lewis 
 
‘Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein’ 
(Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’)  
 
Anxiety, breath, being 
Heidegger had made a similar connection between anxiety and breath a few years 
earlier, in Being and Time (1927): ‘[Anxiety] is oppressive and stifles one’s breath’ 
(BT231/186). Anxiously gasping for air, we are struck dumb: ‘Anxiety robs us of 
speech’ (WM89/112).  
 For Heidegger, all moods, and anxiety in particular, are revelatory, even if 
what they reveal is the mundanity of the most everyday object. Most other moods 
reveal entities (Seienden) in a certain aspect; but anxiety brings us face to face with 
being (Sein). 
 Is it possible to describe this ‘being’ only in the gasping and halting breaths 
that escape us in the grips of anxiety, when we can barely speak at all? If this were so, 
then it would not be the first time in the history of philosophy that being spoke in a 
voice that was merely breath. 
 
The etymology of ‘being’ in ‘breath’ 
Jacques Derrida notes that both Ernest Renan and Friedrich Nietzsche trace the 
etymology of the word ‘being’ back to the word ‘breath’ and, in this instance, 
language tells us something essentially true (Derrida 2001 [1967], 173–4/203–4).1 There 
is, for the tradition we shall be concerned with here — the one that runs between 
Aristotle and Martin Heidegger — an essential connection between being and 
language: for Aristotle, being is ‘said in many ways’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a–
b), which is to say, as soon as language lays hold of that-which-is, what it means to be 
assumes a number of different senses. We shall identify three distinct understandings 
of being, and in each case, we shall show that the language used to speak of them 
involves a particular employment of the breath.  
 This connection between being and breath will ultimately allow us to clarify 
the epigraph with which we began, and the course of the article will reveal something 
of just how rich such an apparently innocuous passage can prove to be. 
 
Being and language: the propositional form 
Western language has from its inception assumed the form of the proposition. The 
proposition or the ‘judgement’ involves a subject and a predicate, joined implicitly or 
explicitly by the ‘copula’ — ‘is’ and its cognates: in other words, being. This at least 
gives us a hint as to why we might say that whenever we speak, whatever we speak 
about, we will always have to invoke the notion of being, almost without meaning to. 
Being speaks — in a manner that is often both glaring and discreet — in the ‘is’ of 
copulation. 
 By linking subject and predicate, the copula, ‘being’, or simply the 
proposition, reveals the subject to us in a certain respect. ‘S’ is revealed to be ‘p’. 
Assuming that one has many different aspects, one’s ‘being’ can be revealed only 
gradually: thus, being, or appearing (for they are the same) is a process, an event, 
whereby the entity is gradually revealed to us in its truth. Since language is nothing 
but the revealing of an entity’s being, the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, a 
heterodox follower of Heidegger, has gone so far as to define ‘being’ as the very 
‘event of language’, its taking place in the form of speech. 
 But it is very rare for speech explicitly to draws attention to itself, and hence 
language is unaccustomed to marking the fact that being speaks within it (perhaps 
indeed it came as a surprise to the reader to witness the self-effacing copula dragged 
so unwillingly into the limelight, a moment ago). To speak of being as such — what 
contortions would language need to undergo in order to express the very gesture that 
language makes quite naturally almost every time we open our mouths, so often and 
so pervasively that we fail almost altogether to notice it? What form of language 
would be up to the task of speaking about being and nothing besides? 
Well, a language that is nothing but breath. 
 
Primary and secondary ousia 
To begin to explain this idea, let us turn to Aristotle. His theories of being and of 
language should allow us to bring out the interrelation between language, breath, and 
being.  
 The Greek word for ‘being’ which interests us here, is ousia. Aristotle 
distinguishes between two senses of this term:  
(1) the singular real thing — which we might call a ‘substance’; and  
(2) the generic characteristics which are then applied to it — which we might 
call ‘essence’: the species and genus into which the individual is sorted: Aristotle 
called the most general forms of these properties, the ‘categories’. 
Aristotle named the first of these, ‘primary ousia’, for the individual substance 
was more real, more truly ‘in being’, than anything else, and certainly more so than 
what he called ‘secondary ousia’, the categories that may be predicated of it, since no 
attribute can exist without a substance to which it might be attached.  
In the Latin of the Middle Ages, these two forms of being (substance and 
essence, the singular and the generic) were sometimes named existence and essence 
— two equally plausible translations of ousia, which capture very well the two most 
important senses of the word ‘being’: an entity (‘a being’) and its Being.  
But these two senses are intimately related to — and we might even say a 
strict consequence of — a certain structure of language. Existence and essence 
correspond to the two parts of any well-formed proposition: the subject and the 
predicate. 
 
Realism and nominalism 
Let us focus on the notion of essence for a moment — the category that is predicated 
of the grammatical subject and hence of the non-grammatical substance which is 
ultimately being spoken of. The most general category that may be attributed to a 
substance is a class to which all entities may be said to belong, and that is being itself. 
This substance, and every imaginable substance, is. Thus, ‘being’ is the most 
universal term that we have, applicable to everything we can know and bespeak. It 
was often said to have such a universality that, in fact, it transcended the generality of 
all the other categories and hence was not even counted as a ‘genus’ at all; rather it 
would be described in these cases as ‘trans-categorial’ (beyond and traversing the 
categories) or simply ‘transcendental’ (that which transcends and makes possible the 
categories along with all of the substances subsumed beneath them). 
But what is most important for our purposes is that such universal categories 
(which were often called simply called ‘universals’ — ‘universal’ because they 
described properties shared by everything belonging to that class) were conceived by 
the history of philosophy in one of two ways, very roughly aligned with the two 
founding fathers of philosophy:  
(a) Platonism, which affirms the real existence of universals, and is hence 
known as ‘realism’. For Platonists, there really is such a thing as the ideal or perfect 
human being, the human ‘itself’ (or the animal or plant...); and  
(b) Aristotelianism, which denies any ‘objective’ reality to the universals, or at 
least denies that general properties may existence in separation from the singular 
substances to which they belong. Universals would be abstractions made from our 
empirical experience of individual substances and thus ultimately creatures of our 
own reason. Universals were mere words in the end, simply ‘names’, and hence the 
term ‘nominalism’ which was employed to describe this position. 
It is in the pages composed by the mediaeval representatives of this latter 
position that we find the phrase we have taken as our title: when a nominalist spoke of 
being, the most universal of all the universals, or something yet more lofty, they did 
so with a ‘flatus vocis’, a ‘voice that is mere air’ or a voice that is merely breath and 
nothing more. 
 Much later on, Nietzsche was to articulate this nominalist idea by stating that 
being, as a notion, was nothing but vapour, an ethereal result of the sublimation of 
real things. Being was such a nebulous and airy notion that to invoke it was to emit 
nothing but ‘hot air’, and to become known as a ‘windbag’ or ‘gasser’. One may 
perhaps hazard the conjecture that anyone who speaks of the metaphysicians and their 
inheritors among those continental philosophers who wish to overcome metaphysics, 
critique, or develop it in some other way, as ‘charlatans’, is speaking much the same 
language, and often for similar reasons. 
 This was the ultimate truth of the etymology of ‘being’ as ‘breath’: 
Nietzsche’s well-known ‘overturning of Platonism’ — Being as a mere respiration of 
the earth. 
 
The mystical breath of the singular substance 
To speak of being (as a universal) is thus to speak in a voice that is mere breath. At 
least, if one is a nominalist, like Aristotle, like the mediaevals from Roscelin to 
Abelard and Ockham, and eventually, like Nietzsche. And if one is speaking about 
being in its secondary sense, as essence. But in truth, things are not so very different if 
one employs ‘being’ in its primary sense, as substance or existence. 
Imagine we could speak of the singular substance itself: to do this one would 
have to speak of a subject before anything determinate had been said of it. This would 
not be easy, because one predicates properties of such a bare substrate (in Greek, 
hypokeimenon) precisely in order to allow that entity to become manifest — to appear 
to our interlocutor from a certain perspective. It is only thus, thanks to the 
propositions we enunciate, that the entity is allowed to be something, to be anything at 
all. Without a subject and a predicate, one does not have a proposition or sentence, 
and hence one does not produce any determinate meaning: one does not reveal 
anything. What sort of speech could forego predication? One might as well have said 
nothing at all. 
 The thing in itself remains ineffable and mute, a ‘mystical’ object. One 
intended to speak, but broke off before beginning, cognisant of the fact that anything 
one said would only betray that to which one wished to lend a voice. Thus, one 
merely breathes — in resignation, satisfaction, frustration, or even ecstasy — and 
remains silent. 
 So, we may conclude that whether one speaks of an absolute singularity or an 
absolute universality, ‘being’ is enunciated with a voice that is (as yet) merely breath. 
In both cases, being is involved in a kind of saying which is in some way incomplete 
on its own, as if the words were frozen on our lips or caught in our throats such that 
we could merely gasp without being able truly to communicate. 
 These are the first two conceptions of being and of breath that we invoked 
towards the beginning. They constitute the two most rigorously opposed ontological 
positions that the Aristotelian tradition has offered us for over two thousand years. 
 
Heidegger’s Being-Breath 
Heidegger set himself the task of thinking a sense of being which was neither of these, 
and which was unheard of in the Aristotelian tradition. His aim was nevertheless to 
explain how the curious word, ‘ousia’, within that tradition, could refer to both 
existence and essence, the singular and the generic. This involved Heidegger in the 
attempt to conceive of being in such a way that it could in no way be mistaken for an 
entity or substance, as something which could be present. Neither the immediate 
empirical presence of a singular entity nor the hyper-presence to the intellect of the 
Platonic idea would do.2 
And funnily enough, the alternative conception of being which Heidegger 
proposes is not without a certain relation to breath. On this point, Heidegger’s words 
will in truth have been the inspiration for this piece from the very start and they have 
tacitly guided our interpretation of all the ideas we have engaged with. 
 
Breath and Anxiety  
Our epigraph reads: ‘Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers 
perpetually through Dasein’ (WM93/117).  
There are at least two places in the Heideggerian corpus where breath is related 
if not directly to being then to the next best thing: the mood in which we are 
confronted with it, when all significance has drained away, and every entity we might 
cling on to has slipped from our grasp: anxiety (Angst, in German). 
In Being and Time (1927), anxiety is said to be ‘oppressive and stifles one’s 
breath’ (BT231/186). Anxiety leaves us breathless, and this absence of breath is 
somehow expressive of our experience: an encounter with what Heidegger calls ‘the 
nothing’ (das Nichts). This nothing is the absence of all entities, their utter 
meaninglessness and refusal of themselves. But if we cease to view this nothingness 
from the standpoint of that which has been annihilated, it reveals itself to us in a new 
and positive form, as being (das Sein).  
Breathless anxiety bespeaks an encounter with ‘utter insignificance’ 
(BT231/187), and this is intimately related to the oppressive, constricting character of 
anxiety: ‘What oppresses us is not this or that [not an entity that could positively be 
present …;] it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it 
is the world itself’ (BT231/187). What distresses us in anxiety is being. 
Heidegger implies that being in its purity, as we find it in anxiety, cannot be 
spoken of during the encounter. It is so shocking, so unaccustomed, so wonderful in 
its way, that it strikes the air from our lungs. What rendered the early Greeks 
speechless with amazement (thaumadzein) and perplexity (aporia), the very fact that 
things are — the advent of their being — is today encountered in anxiety. Or perhaps 
being has accrued a different sense today, and provokes a correspondingly different 
reaction. Any attempt to describe what the experience of anxiety is like, and to say 
what was revealed to us in anxiety, can be done only in hindsight, retrospectively: 
‘When anxiety has subsided…’, Heidegger says.  
 
When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are 
accustomed to say that “it was really nothing”. And what it was, indeed, does 
get reached ontically [i.e. in terms of entities {ta onta, in Greek}, from the 
standpoint of their presence] by such a way of talking. (BT231/187) 
 
From the perspective of beings as a whole, being really is nothing, but this nothing 
punches a hole in a terrain which we formerly understood to be constituted entirely of 
presence, and therefore this void cannot but attract our attention. To capture 
something of the ‘negativity’ of being, Heidegger inverts the traditional image of the 
Platonic sun (a metaphor for the highest idea, the idea of the good, which exists more 
truly than anything else — ‘being’, for the realism of Platonism). He speaks of the 
‘clear [or bright] night of the nothing [hellen Nacht des Nichts]’ (WM90/114).  
As if blinded by the sun, or struck dumb by its sudden eclipse, we have 
nothing to say, so accustomed are we to speaking the language of entities — the 
language of the proposition.  
 
Anxiety in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ 
Shall we ever speak of anxiety and being — once things have calmed down and our 
eyes adjusted to the dark? To clarify the question of the language we might use to 
speak of being, let us turn to Heidegger’s ‘What is Metaphysics?’ (1929). Here, just 
two years after Being and Time, something has subtly changed in the account of 
anxiety. 
In ‘What is Metaphysics?’ anxiety is said to rob us not of breath, but of speech, 
and in such a way as to leave us nevertheless in possession of a certain kind of breath 
— a jittery breath, frozen on the threshold of language, just prior to the articulation of 
fully-fledged speech. If it amounts to any kind of speech at all, this gasping for breath 
is an entirely empty speech which conveys nothing of what the speaker is really 
undergoing. 
Let us read this long, fascinating passage, which does not fail to stress the 
retroactive character of a revelatory speech when it comes to anxiety: 
 
All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the 
sense of mere disappearance. Rather, in this very receding things turn towards 
us. The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses 
us. We can get no hold on things. […]  
Anxiety makes manifest the nothing. 
[A]nxiety [...] induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This 
implies that we ourselves […] slip away from ourselves or lose our grip [...] 
Anxiety robs us of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that 
just the nothing crowds round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the ‘is’ falls 
silent [propositional talk, with its famous copula, will do us no good here — 
ML]. That in the malaise of anxiety we often try to shatter the vacant stillness 
with compulsive talk only proves the presence of the nothing. […] [W]hen 
anxiety has dissolved[,] [in] the lucid vision sustained by fresh remembrance we 
must say that that in the face of which and concerning which we were anxious 
was ‘properly’ — nothing. (WM88–9/111–12) 
 But the breath that is left to us, as our gabbling attempts to say something intelligible 
trail off into silence, is not simply our breath. Something, here, is breathing through 
us, attempting perhaps to achieve expression: Heidegger goes so far as to say that it is 
anxiety itself which breathes — it even sleeps, the state in which, as Aristotle was the 
first to notice, we breathe most deeply.  
Heidegger is speaking of 
 
the nothing that only anxiety originally unveils. But this implies that the 
originary anxiety in Dasein is usually repressed. Anxiety is there. It is only 
sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein, only slightly in what 
makes us ‘jittery’, imperceptibly in the ‘Oh, yes’ and the ‘Oh, no’ of men of 
affairs; but most readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are 
basically daring. (WM93/117–8)  
  
Breath, anxious breath, rustles through us and our speech becomes tremulous. Might 
this alien breath be the incipient voice of something that is trying, as yet inarticulately, 
to speak through us? Anxiety’s breath animates us, urging us to speak in spite of our 
anxiety, but it seems that the only language we have at our disposal in such a state 
remains inadequate to it. 
Only later, when one has regained control of one’s breathing and had a chance 
to reflect can this affective experience become revelatory, or perhaps it is only then 
that its formerly mystical revelation can be shared. Only afterwards can we 
understand the void of actuality (presence) as the space of possibility. Being comes to 
us in anxiety, but we cannot speak of it straightaway; it takes the opportunity to seize 
hold of our errant breath, while we can only pant.  
In contrast to Heidegger’s earlier account, anxiety does not rob us of both 
speech and its prerequisite, breath, but rather instils in us a new breath, the silence of 
which we shall come to understand as the rich potentiality of another speech, another 
language, which tells not of beings but of being. 
 When Heidegger relates anxiety with breath, and breath with being, he is by 
no means speaking arbitrarily: he never does. We should hear this deprivation of 
speech in favour of an insignificant jittery breath, a wind blowing from elsewhere, 
disturbing us at first, as an allusion to a language which has not yet achieved a 
determinate signification or propositional form — viewed not from the perspective of 
some meaning it might eventually attain, but rather from the standpoint of the pure 
potential-to-signify that precedes it. Being inspires us with a language which is 
thereby restored to a state of pure potentiality — and for Heidegger, being itself is 
nothing but potential, possibility, rethought and rescued from its traditional 
subordination to actuality: substance and presence. 
 
Being’s Voice — The Call of Conscience 
Heidegger does indeed invoke a speech which is pure possibility: he does so, in his 
early works, in the guise of the ‘call of conscience’, to which anxiety is intimately 
related — conscience is said to ‘ready us’ for anxiety (BT342/296). In Being and 
Time, Heidegger describes conscience as the ‘origin of discourse’, the most original 
form of speech (ibid.). Conscience is a voiceless voice, a voice without voice, for it 
calls in the way of silence. It is a voice that talks to us rather than of anything in 
particular. It whispers to us in our solitude, warning us of a potential fault, or a debt 
already incurred, and ultimately of a certain lack in our being which we shall never be 
able to restore — but here we must once again make the switch in perspective and 
tone, a shift of Gestalt, and to discern in this negativity not a lack of tangible actuality 
but an unfulfilled potential, yet to be unfolded: for conscience speaks to us in fact of a 
possibility so rich that we shall never be through with its actualisation. Conscience is 
a memento mori insofar as death is the model of a possibility that belongs to each and 
every one of us but which is never actualised for us, and so remains ‘always 
outstanding’, always inactual, but impending. Death is the purest possibility, and the 
hard task of conscience is constantly — but for the most part gently — to remind us 
of this fact, breathing somewhere close to our inner ear that there is still much to be 
done. 
Much yet to be. If the breathy voice of conscience speaks to us of anything, it 
speaks of being in Heidegger’s sense. This is why Heidegger will later, having moved 
away from a straightforwardly ‘existential’ approach to being, centred around the 
human being, with its almost overwhelming stress on the need for ‘authenticity’, 
speak no longer of the voice of conscience but of the voice of being.3 
 
Atemwende 
The voice that bespeaks being says nothing. Because being is not an entity. From the 
standpoint of entities, and the words which designate them — but above all the 
propositional structure, so closely bound up with the metaphysics of substance — 
being is ‘nothing’. That which is not present: what could it be but sheer nothingness?  
To an Aristotelian, is being even less than nothing, and the breath which 
carries and puffs up our empty words a mere semblance of language? Is the breath of 
Heidegger’s call still more empty than the flatus vocis of the nominalists? What sense 
of being and breath are we speaking of here? 
 Everything hangs on how we understand ‘breath’, and indeed on how we 
speak of it, if we can. All depends on whether we can make the shift from thinking of 
breath as an empty negativity to conceiving of it as the richest potentiality for speech, 
and indeed as the evocation of the very taking place of language from out of the 
purest but also the most pregnant of silences. 
In Heidegger’s voice we should hear a breathing which is distinct from both of 
the senses of being and breath that we encountered in the Aristotelian tradition — the 
mystical voice of pure singularity, and the nominalist deflation of those pretentious 
Platonists with their heads in the clouds. The Heideggerian voice will need to be 
understood as a voice of pure potentiality — or even, as some have said, virtuality, 
which signifies a possibility that is not modelled upon any actuality and which will 
never be exhausted by any number of actualisations. Heidegger’s being is a possibility 
cut loose from the tyranny of the actuality it might eventually have become, or for 
which it would stand as the transcendental condition.  
Being is thus neither a singular substance nor a generic essence, neither 
subject nor predicate, but the breath that must be exhaled before either part of the 
sentence can be articulated, and which no determinate proposition will in any case 
exhaust. Being is the singularity of the event of language, the event of a saying which 
is in each case unique, and which — if it is well said — will reveal entities anew 
every single time. 
Heidegger thus gives us a new sense of breath, a new sense of emptiness and 
void, understood as the aether or clearing in which entities may show themselves 
without let or hindrance. 
 
* * * 
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Notes 
1 See Škof (2015) for a reading of this and many other relevant passages. See also Nietzsche 1962, and 
Renan 1864. 
2 To bring out the conception of being which they oppose, both Heidegger and Derrida will risk 
translating ‘ousia’ as ‘presence’, which has the merit of indicating that one of the connections between 
these two widely disparate senses is their mutual relationship with time, and in particular the ‘present’ 
rather than the past or the future — a matter which has gone largely unthought in the tradition itself. 
3 Let us not look askance at such locutions: being has always had a voice or two. This Stimme of 
Heidegger’s is but a distant relative of those other ‘vox’s which so marked the mediaeval reception of 
Aristotle — we have met one before, in the guise of the flatus vocis, but we should not forget the 
debate regarding the unity of the many senses of being which, from Aristotle onwards, shuffles 
between synonymy (same word, same sense), homonymy (same word, different senses), and paronymy 
or the ‘pros hen’ (‘towards one’ overriding sense of being from which every other would be derived, or 
to which they would be ‘analogous’). These found their way into the Latin vocabulary in the guise of 
univocity, equivocity, and analogy (of proportion): the question was whether being speaks with one 
voice, two, or even more, throughout the various entities which are manifest to the intellect and senses 
in its light. Our question throughout has been as to the breath of this voice, and what it signifies. 
Heidegger will have his own response to this debate. 
